We examine an export game where two firms (home and foreign), located in two different countries, produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is the most efficient in terms of R&D costs of quality development and the foreign country is relatively larger and endowed with a relatively higher income. The unique (risk-dominant) Nash equilibrium involves intra-industry trade and the foreign producer manufactures a good of higher quality than the domestic firm. For low enough transport costs, this equilibrium is characterized by unilateral dumping; otherwise, reciprocal dumping emerges. We show that the implementation of antidumping (AD) policy can change significantly the nature of the game and give rise to various new Nash equilibria. For some parameters, an AD policy leads to a quality reversal in the international market whereby the low-quality firm becomes leader. We show that such a policy is desirable for the implementing country, though world welfare decreases. The paper also establishes an equivalence result between a price undertaking and an anti-dumping duty.
Introduction
Leapfrogging is central to the catching-up process of developing and transition economies. The underlying idea is that latecomers may be able to bypass old vintages of technology and thereby become highly competitive. In addition, quality reversals are important for making industry leadership persistent, since the higher profits accruing from high-quality production provide firms with the financial resources needed for the continued adoption of the latest technologies and cost-reducing investments.
The cases of leapfrogging have been diverse, depending upon industries and countries, but there is strong evidence against the outward-oriented argument by which the market mechanism gives enough incentives for firms in emerging markets to reach the technology frontier (Brutton, 1998) . Instead, the policy issue has been to design market protection schemes to induce learning, knowledge accumulation and quality leadership. In doing so, governments have traditionally used an array of non-market and market instruments, including trade and industrial policy as well as antidumping policy.
A classic example is the battle between US and Japanese semiconductor manufacturers, which dates back to 1960s when the American producers started to expand their operations in Japan.
The Japanese government employed quotas and tariffs to slow down the penetration of the American companies; in addition, it subsidized heavily the development of semiconductor manufacturing technology and the expansion of its industry worldwide (Borrus et al., 1986) . In the early 1980s, American companies saw their market shares and profits fall, making it difficult to maintain cost and quality standards. Towards the middle of the 1980s several US firms, including Micron Technology Inc., Intel and AMD, accused their Japanese competitors of dumping in the US market and elsewhere (Hughes et al., 1997) . Anti-dumping duties and retaliatory tariffs on Japanese imports of electronic gear helped the American firms catch up in terms of learning-by-doing and quality standards later in the 1980s. The battle was ended by a series of pacts between the US and the Japanese administrations. 1 The Chinese newsprint industry is another example illustrating the use of anti-dumping measures as an instrument to gain time for development and acquisition of advanced equipment. In 1997 Chinese newsprint makers made dumping allegations against overseas producers. As a result, the Chinese government started to levy anti-dumping tariffs in 1999, for a period of five years.
The anti-dumping regime promoted rapid development in the domestic newsprint industry, and industry production increased by 40% during the period (Lu, 2004) . In 2004, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced that it would continue to impose anti-dumping duties on US, Canada and South Korea's newsprint imports.
For members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), market protection via tariff barriers is nowadays limited by countries' commitments to bind their customs duty rates during multilateral trade negotiations. In contrast, anti-dumping measures whose application is governed by Article VI of GATT are not limited. 2 Notes: (1) June 2010; (2) Number of new initiations; (3) Share of group of users in total initiations in a particular year or period (in percentages).
Source: Authors' own calculations based on WTO website. Table 1 Remarkably, developing and emerging economies target most of their AD initiations against firms from more developed countries. As Table 2 indicates, the percentage of initiations aimed at firms from countries with a larger (2008) income per capita is 99% for India, the largest initiator of AD measures, and range between 34% and 95% for other new users. Sources: GDP per capita from the World Bank; authors' own calculations based on the Global Antidumping Database (Bown, 2010) .
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical model to help explain these observations. For this purpose, we introduce a novel model of intra-industry trade with product quality differentiation. We first examine the strategic incentives of oligopolistic firms to dump exports in developing economies. We then study the incentives of the domestic firm to file a petition for antidumping action and, in turn, of the domestic government to impose a price undertaking (PU). Our main result is that an anti-dumping intervention can lead to a quality reversal. In that case, domestic firm incentives are aligned with the government incentives and antidumping actions are then expected to arise. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper identifying trade conditions under which an anti-dumping action is welfare improving for the intervening country.
Bearing in mind that anti-dumping (AD) actions by a government sanction findings of dumping by exporting firms into a particular country, a number of stylized facts have inspired our framework of analysis:
• There is substantial empirical evidence that product quality matters, as globalization of the international economy involves more trade with transition and developing countries. Because of lower quality standards in these countries, local firms produce and export goods whose quality is inferior to that of Western firms. As a result, a significant proportion of trade is now characterized by different levels of quality. In a sample of 60 countries Hallack (2006) shows that there are large differences in the quality of products that are exported. Using a novel method to account for variation in trade balances induced by horizontal and vertical differentiation, Hallack and Schott (2011) substantiate the importance of product quality by tracing the evolution of manufacturing quality for the world's top exporters. Greenaway et al. (1994 Greenaway et al. ( , 1995 show that over two thirds of all intra-industry trade in the UK involves trade of vertically differentiated goods. From the numerous anti-dumping investigations, considerable differences in the types of products made worldwide emerge. In particular, hearings and public reports reveal that, besides prices, perceived quality differences are important in many AD cases (USITC, 2001 (USITC, , 2002a (USITC, , 2002b (USITC, , 2003 .
• The heterogeneity of countries involved in international trade suggests substantial differences in consumer tastes and incomes across countries as well as cost asymmetries across firms.
• Petitions filed by a US industry against imports concern products which are usually classified under 10 digit subheadings of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States. At this level of disaggregation, sources of supply of this product in a domestic market are a few firms.
Even in large trading blocs like the US or the EU, it is common that a case concerns two players, a local and a foreign producer. See, for example, EC (2002b, p. 25 and 48) and USITC (2001, 2002b, 2008) .
We analyze an international trade game between two firms located in two different countries (developed vs. developing) that produce quality-differentiated products. Domestic and foreign consumers have heterogenous preferences for quality. Markets are asymmetric in that they differ in size and in the distribution of consumer tastes. The quality-differentiated good is supplied at home and abroad by a local firm and by imports from the foreign producer. Markets are not totally served in equilibrium, implying endogenous market sizes. Quality development is costly and firms in developing countries face higher costs in order to produce a given quality level. The paper focuses on situations where there is dumping by the high quality producing country. After the domestic government either opts for free trade or AD policy, firms play a two-stage game. 3 In the first stage, firms select the qualities to be produced, and incur the fixed costs; in the second stage, firms engage in an export and price competition game.
We show the existence of a unique (risk-dominant) free trade equilibrium that is characterized by intra-industry trade. The foreign firm, which is more efficient, produces a good of higher quality than the domestic firm. Since consumers across countries differ in their concern for quality, unilateral dumping by the foreign firm into the domestic market arises in equilibrium. When transport costs are sufficiently high, reciprocal dumping obtains.
Focusing on situations where dumping is unilateral, we study the effect of a PU on the trade equilibrium and show that a PU may lead to radical changes in market structure. We first show that a PU may result in the strategic exit of the foreign firm from the domestic market. When this happens, we may expect the domestic firm to file a petition since, it if it were honored, this firm would see its profits to increase. We show however that a domestic government who cares about aggregate domestic welfare would not honor the petition.
Secondly, we show that a PU may lead to the exit of the domestic firm from the foreign market.
The rationale for doing so is that the overall level of prices in the markets would increase. Also in this case, the domestic firm may wish to file a petition for antidumping action, which again would not be honored by a welfarist domestic government. 3 In our model the enactment and application of law are assumed simultaneous since there will be plain evidence that the WTO dumping criteria are met. In practice, however, cases are less clear-cut, implying that more stages in the game should be included to embed administrative costs and recognize the discrete time intervals between the enactment of law, the filing process and the application of law.
Finally, we show that a PU may result in a quality reversal, that is, a change in quality leadership with the home firm becoming quality leader. In this case, imposing a PU is socially desirable for the domestic country, though world welfare decreases. There are two such equilibria: one in which there is intra-industry trade, another where the foreign firm producing low quality refrains from exporting to the home market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section discusses results of the model in light of the related literature. Section 3 presents the details of our model. Section 4 solves for the free trade equilibrium and establishes the conditions for dumping. The effects of a PU are examined in Section 5. Section 6 shows that our results are not undermined if we allow the firms to choose the level of the quality they produce. This section also establishes an equivalence result between AD duties and price undertakings in our model. Section 7 concludes.
Related literature
Our paper is a contribution to the study of antidumping in oligopolistic industries. The literature on antidumping is extensive and the reader is referred to Feenstra (2003) and the survey of Blonigen and Prusa (2003) for a detailed discussion. With the exception of Vandenbussche and Wauthy (2001) , the literature has dedicated little attention to the role of quality differences in the determination of dumping and the desirability of AD policy. As we will show, this is an important omission since AD policies modify firms' incentives to select product quality which, in turn, affect the extent of competition in the international market and hence firms' profits and social welfare.
In some situations, we show that AD legislation might even lead to a quality reversal in the international market. Various papers (see e.g. Ethier and Fisher, 1987; Fisher, 1992; Leidy and Hoekman, 1990; Reitzes, 1993) have examined how AD protection gives firms incentives to alter their price or output decisions vis-à-vis free trade in order to influence the AD outcome. This may lead to higher or lower welfare depending on the existing market structure. Anderson et al. (1995) examine a variant of the reciprocal dumping model of Brander and Krugman (1983) where two governments can enact AD law or not. They find that welfare-maximizing governments impose no law in equilibrium. Moreover, though an individual firm has an incentive to lobby for AD law, consumer welfare increases and firm profits fall if laws are bilaterally enacted. Another branch in the literature studies how AD policy influences the incentives of firms to collude (see e.g. Staiger and Wolak, 1992; Veugelers and Vandenbussche, 1999).
The distinctive feature of our paper is the study of the effects of antidumping legislation in an international market where firms produce vertically differentiated products. In this regard, Vandenbussche and Wauthy (2001) is the paper most closely related to ours. They study a game of one-way trade between a domestic and a foreign firm. Using the "lay" definition of dumping (Weinstein, 1992) where the competing local price is used as a proxy for the "normal" value of the good, they show that, relative to free trade, a PU gives the foreign firm incentives to be more aggressive and become the quality leader in the domestic market. AD law leads in this case to lower social welfare for the home country. In contrast, we use a model of intra-industry trade and therefore allow for the more standard definition of dumping, the one put forward by the WTO (see the WTO website).
Our paper is also related to the work explaining how product quality matters in international trade. The monopoly problem is discussed in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Krishna (1987) Against this background which depicts a certain misuse of AD law by governments, this paper introduces a new interpretation of domino dumping which is theoretically different from the standard retaliatory motive associated to AD law enactment but which is empirically hard to distinguish in the data. Once the home government enacts AD law, foreign rival firms which suffer from antidumping enforcement, have incentives to react strategically by exiting the home market. As a result of decreased competitive pressures in the home market, local firms which charge higher prices may dump their products abroad and lead the foreign government to take antidumping actions. 4 Though AD measures may have small effects on global trade, these trade effects may be large for some AD-imposing countries. 
The Model
Two firms sell goods that are vertically differentiated. These two firms, located in two different countries, home and foreign, produce goods for their own market and, eventually, for exports. The firm located in the foreign (home) country is referred to as the foreign (home) firm and all foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk " * ". We index destination countries by i = 1, 2 where subscript 1 refers to the home country and subscript 2 to the foreign country. We assume there are transport costs, denoted by r, associated to moving goods from country to country. For convenience, we suppose transport costs are of the "iceberg" type.
Product quality may be one of two types: high-quality q h and low-quality q , with q h > q . 5 We adopt the cost specification of pure vertical product differentiation models, where the costs of quality mainly fall on fixed costs and involve only a small or no increase in unit variable costs (see Sutton, 1982, 1983) . In particular, once the home (foreign) firm picks the quality of the goods to be offered, it pays a fixed cost C(q) = cq 2 /2, q = {q h , q } (C * (q) = c * q 2 /2) and produces at a marginal cost which is normalized to zero. 6 Fixed cost asymmetries across firms in different countries may capture differences in the available production technologies as well as in the costs of labor and capital. They are important in this paper because they help us pin down a unique equilibrium in qualities. As we will see later, the size of these costs is not relevant and can then be taken to be arbitrarily small, in particular, we let c → 0, and c * → 0, with c * /c = γ ∈ (0, 1). 7 Assume there is a population of measure m (1) at the home (foreign) country, with 0 < m ≤ 1.
Consumers buy at most one unit and have preferences given by the following quasi-linear (indirect) utility function: U = θq − p, if a unit of a good of quality q is bought at price p, and 0 otherwise.
Parameter θ is consumer specific and measures the utility a consumer derives from consuming a unit of quality. Assume that θ is uniformly distributed over [0, λθ] at home, and over [0, θ] abroad, with 0 < λ ≤ 1, θ > 0. Tirole (1988) shows that θ is the inverse of the marginal utility of income so our assumption λ ≤ 1 implies that foreign consumers have higher incomes on average and more sophisticated tastes. Our specification of demand thus captures income differences between 5 In Section 6, we allow firms to choose quality from a continuum. 6 This normalization is without loss of generality provided that the main bulk of costs falls on fixed costs rather than on variable costs. Adding small marginal costs of production makes computations cumbersome and obscures the presentation of the results substantially without adding further insights. 7 The specification of the cost function could be more general without affecting results qualitatively. For example, Moraga-González and Viaene (2005) use cost functions with a degree of homogeneity k ≥ 2. While larger k values affect results quantitatively, they do not alter them qualitatively.
countries via λ and size differences between countries via parameter m. The assumption that λ is less than 1 serves to focus the model on the interaction between firms located in developing and developed countries. 8 Let p and p h be the prices for low-and high-quality products in the domestic country. Suppose, for a moment, that p h > p , i.e., high quality is sold at a higher price, an assumption that will be verified later. Firms' demand functions are obtained as follows. There is a consumer, denoted by θ, who is indifferent between buying high quality or low quality. Using the utility function, it is readily seen that θ = (p h − p ) /(q h − q ). Likewise, let θ denote the consumer indifferent between acquiring the low-quality good or nothing at all, that is, θ = p /q . Then, the high-quality good is demanded by those consumers such that θ ≤ θ ≤ θ and the low-quality variant is demanded by those buyers such that θ ≤ θ < θ. As θ is uniformly distributed on [0, λθ], home demands for highand low-quality goods are:
Note that one of these demands is met by imports from the foreign firm. Proceeding in the same way we can compute the foreign demands for high-and low-quality goods:
where p * and p * h are foreign prices of low-and high-quality, p * h > p * . As before, one of these demands is met by imports from the home firm.
Free trade equilibrium
The assumptions of our model depict a situation in which a domestic firm, located in a smaller and poorer country, considers, besides supplying its own market, to export to a larger and richer country. It faces competition from a foreign firm, which is more efficient. Given this, the following three questions arise:
• What is the pattern of trade that emerges in equilibrium once both countries open up to trade?
• What are the product qualities that are produced by each firm in equilibrium?
• For which of the two firms, if any, is it optimal to dump its good in the international market?
We address these three issues in this section and focus on the market equilibrium under free trade. Since there are two quality levels available for choice, q h and q , this section studies an export game where the domestic and foreign firms can freely pick which of the two qualities to offer and which prices to set in the two different countries. 9 
Risk-dominant Nash equilibrium
There are four relevant continuation games, 10 each of them ensuing after the firms have picked a quality-and-export strategy profile. The quality-and-export strategy set of a firm i is S i = {{q &E}, {q h &E}} for i = 1, 2 where E stands for export and means that the firm will export its good to the other market. In what follows we compute the price equilibrium corresponding to each quality-and-export strategy profile.
Suppose first that the two firms choose to produce different quality levels. Firms choose their prices to maximize their world revenues. The firm selling high quality has revenues equal to
h D * h while the corresponding revenues for the low-quality firm are p D +p * (1−r)D * . Taking the first order conditions (FOCs) and solving for the Nash equilibrium yields the following prices in the domestic country:
In the foreign country we have p * = p /λ, p * h = p h /λ. Suppose now that firms choose to produce the same quality levels. Since firms compete in a Bertrand fashion, it is clear that competition will drive prices down to zero thereby eroding all variable profits of the firms.
Given this information, we can now fold the game backwards and write down in Table 4 the normal-form game at the choice-of-quality and export stage. 
where R and R h , which are given by:
denote the revenues of a low-and a high-quality firm under free trade, respectively.
Assuming product differentiation gives sufficient revenues to cover the (small) fixed costs, this game has two Nash equilibria. In one equilibrium, {q &E, q h &E}, the domestic firm produces the low-quality product and in the alternative equilibrium, {q h &E, q &E}, it is the home firm that produces high quality. As discussed in detail in Motta et al. (1997) and in Moraga-González and Viaene (2005), selection of equilibria in this type of games requires to use the risk-dominance criterion of Harsany-Selten. Applying this criterion to our game, we now show that as long as firms' costs differ, irrespective of whether they are large or small, one of the equilibria can readily be refined away. 11
be the gains the domestic firm obtains by predicting correctly that the foreign firm will select equilibrium 1, {q &E, q h &E}. Likewise,
h − q 2 ) denotes the gains the domestic firm derives by forecasting correctly that the foreign firm will select equilibrium 2, {q h &E, q &E}. Similarly, for the foreign firm we have
It is said that equilibrium 1 risk-dominates equilibrium 2 whenever
It is straightforward to verify that this inequality holds whenever γ < 1. In fact, we need to show that:
The next proposition characterizes the assignment of qualities across firms under free trade.
Proposition 1 (Quality leadership)
In the unique risk-dominant free trade equilibrium, the foreign firm produces high quality and the domestic firm chooses low quality.
The quality leader is thus the most efficient firm in terms of development costs. 12 This important result indicates that the sustainability of quality leadership under free trade hinges on firms' cost asymmetries only and not on market size or income differences.
To assess welfare effects of antidumping action, we shall use the weighted sum of consumer surplus and firms' payoffs as a measure of social welfare in every country:
With exogenous levels of quality, firms' payoffs are equal to revenues. In Section 6 where we allow firms to choose the level of the quality of their products, development costs are included as part of welfare calculations. Weights β 1 and β 2 characterize policymaker's preferences. If
we have the usual (neutral) definition of social welfare; if β 1 = 1 and β 2 = 0, the government cares only about consumer surplus; finally when β 1 = 0 and β 2 = 1, only firm's revenues matter for the policy maker. 13 Domestic consumer surplus is given by:
where F (θ) is the cumulative distribution function of θ.
Let us define µ = q h /q , with µ > 1 since q h > q . Variable µ represents the quality gap between firms' variants and measures the degree of product differentiation. The next proposition characterizes the free trade equilibrium:
Proposition 2 (Free trade equilibrium) There is a unique risk-dominant free trade equilibrium of the export game. This equilibrium involves intra-industry trade and is characterized as follows: (i) The domestic firm picks q and the foreign firm picks q h ; (ii) These goods sell at prices:
in the two countries. (iii) Market demands for each firm are:
and D h = 2D ; D * h = 2D * ; (iv) Firms' revenues are given by (3) with R and R h being domestic and foreign firm's revenue respectively. The ratio of revenues is:
(v) Consumer surplus in each country is:
(vi) Assuming β 1 = β 2 = 1, social welfare is:
The Grubel-Lloyd measure of two-way trade (in value) is:
This proposition describes the benchmark of our analysis. For any µ, demands are positive so the market equilibrium involves intra-industry trade in vertically differentiated products, like in the contributions of Falvey (1981) and Shaked and Sutton (1984) . The Grubel-Lloyd index (10) depends on the primitive parameters of the model: relative country size m, relative taste difference λ, transport cost r and the gap between qualities q h and q . Besides being a measure of product differentiation, µ relates to the extent of price competition between firms since, by taking the ratio of prices in (5) and (6), we obtain
The importance of producing high quality is further stressed by the ratio of revenues in (8) , which is equal to 4µ when r = 0. This is partly explained by the discrepancy in hedonic prices, the hedonic price of high quality being twice that of low quality (p h /q h = 2p l /q l ).
Occurrence of dumping
Let us check whether dumping arises in this free trade equilibrium. The intra-industry trade nature of the trade equilibrium is useful since it allows us to apply the traditional WTO definition of dumping. The latter relies on three principles. First, a local firm may petition the government for relief if dumped imports materially injure the competing domestic firm. In the market equilibrium just described, domestic and foreign demands are such that the foreign firm's market share D h /(D l + D h ) is two thirds of the domestic market (see (7)). It is clear that this proportion is large enough to justify injury. A second issue to substantiate a case for antidumping action is that the products involved must be 'like' products. The 'likeness' means alike in all respects, or, alternatively, having characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration, like in our model. Third, a product is to be considered as being dumped if its export price to a particular country is less than a 'normal' value, standard used by the WTO, or less than a "fair value," standard used by the US government. There are different ways of calculating a product's "normal" or "fair" value.
The standard definition of dumping, the one put forward by the WTO (see the WTO website), is when the fob export price to a particular country is less than the price the firm normally charges in its own market. In our framework, this definition of dumping amounts to comparing p with p * (1 − r), and p * h with p h (1 − r). This yields the following result: 14 Proposition 3 (Dumping) Under free trade high-quality products are always dumped; when λ > 1 − r both types of product are dumped and dumping is reciprocal.
Our result above is in line with traditional treatments of dumping in that it shows the possibility of reciprocal dumping based on transportation costs (Anderson et al. 1995; Brander and Krugman, 1983; Weinstein, 1992) . However, dumping is unilateral when transportation costs are small or zero. Even with positive transportation costs, only the high-quality product may be dumped but it all depends on the cross-country difference in the distribution of tastes. A popular belief is that lowquality goods are dumped in export markets because they usually command a lower price. In our setting, the reverse occurs more often: it is the high-quality good that is dumped into the smaller and poorer country. Dumping of high-quality products arises because cross-country differences in the distribution of tastes provide the foreign firm with incentives to cut its export price relative to the price it charges in its own market. The intuition is simple: higher income, here translated into more sophisticated tastes, gives rise to higher prices in the foreign market for all goods.
Antidumping policy
Two AD policy instruments are commonly used by governments, namely, price undertakings and antidumping duties. The former is more commonly used in the EU while the latter is observed more frequently in the US. A PU is a binding commitment to raise export prices so that either the dumping or the injury suffered from dumped imports by the domestic country is eliminated (GATT, 1991, p. 74). An antidumping duty equalizes the price that consumers in different countries pay for the same good by means of a duty. The analysis that follows examines price undertakings, antidumping duties being studied later in Section 6 where an equivalence result between these two AD instruments is derived.
Quality and export strategies of firms
What are domestic government's incentives to intervene? The answer to this question is obtained by comparing domestic welfare attained under free trade with that under a PU. As the focus of our analysis is on the new users of AD policy (cf. Table 1) , we limit the number of issues by considering only the case where high-quality products are dumped in the free trade equilibrium.
This corresponds to the parameter space where λ < 1 − r. For any non-negative value of r, we can appropriately choose λ so that condition λ < 1 − r is satisfied. To make things simple, let us assume r = 0 in which case λ can vary freely between 0 and 1. 15
With high-quality products being dumped, a PU constrains the foreign firm to set an export price that is equal to its local price, that is:
We note that this constraint gives rise to an array of strategic responses by the firms at play.
For example, as we will show below, for some parameter values, the foreign firm prefers to exit the home market. The question is then whether it prefers to continue to produce high quality or instead prefers to deviate by producing low quality. In the latter case, we say that a quality reversal occurs. For alternative parameter values, it is the domestic firm that exits the foreign market since by doing so it raises prices in all markets, which ultimately benefits it. Therefore, to find out when it is optimal for the domestic government to impose a PU, we need to solve the continuation game played by the firms once the PU is in place. We solve the game in what follows.
Let E and N E denote an exporting and non-exporting strategy respectively. The strategy set of a firm i is
and the game played by the two firms is summarized in the following table: Table 4 : Quality and export strategy profiles of the two firms
Foreign firm
Home firm
In each cell, R (R * ) is a shorthand notation for expressions representing the international revenues of the home (foreign) firm under different strategies. Other cells report the simpler expressions for either monopoly profits when one firm selects itself out of the export market, or for zero duopoly profits when firms choose to produce the same quality level. To shorten the expressions, we do not write the corresponding fixed costs of quality. 15 An array of interesting situations arise when both governments decide to enact an AD policy. With r = 0, and reciprocal dumping, both governments may have an incentive to take antidumping actions. However, governments have opposite incentives in that actions by the home government are aimed at helping the home firm to gain quality leadership while the foreign government wants to counter that. In terms of their impact on international trade, as Revenues in each cell of Table 4 are obtained from derivations similar to those for the free trade equilibrium while imposing the price constraint (11) . Let us start by looking closer at the pair of strategies s 11 = {q &E, q h &E}, payoffs from other strategy pairs being obtained in a similar way.
Under strategy profile s 11 , the foreign firm produces and exports high quality while the domestic firm produces and exports low quality. This is basically the same as under free trade but, because a PU is in place, the foreign firm must set an export price that is equal to its local price to maximize (2) . Solving for the new Nash equilibrium in prices, we get:
Demands become:
The revenues obtained by the firms in this case are:
Comparing demand expressions (7) to (14) and (15), it is clear that trade volumes are not modified by the imposition of a PU: world demand for low-quality products (D + D * ) and for highquality products (D h + D * h ) are similar under both free trade and PU. However, the distribution of quantities changes: domestic firm's local sales increase while its exports decrease by the same volume. Likewise, exports of the foreign firm decrease while its local sales increase by the same volume. 16 Note that all demands are strictly positive except for possibly D h (s 11 ). The fact that D h (s 11 ) can become zero for certain parameter configurations is of paramount importance in our setting, since it means that a PU gives incentives to the high-quality foreign firm to exit the export market.
Therefore, suppose that firms play strategy s 12 = {q &E, q h &N E} instead, i.e., the foreign firm exits the home market. The home market would be monopolized by the domestic firm and there would only be competition in the foreign market. Equilibrium prices in the foreign market in this situation are:
The revenues of the firms from the foreign market in that case turn out to be:
Consider now the pair of strategies s 21 = {q &N E, q h &E}. In this case the foreign firm must
Likewise, the domestic firm has revenues equal to p D , where D , D h and D * h are given in (1) and (2) . Taking the FOCs and solving for the equilibrium prices yields:
Interestingly, the price of the foreign producer goes up and by implication so does the price of the domestic producer. This implies that, at least potentially, the domestic firm can increase its profit by exiting the foreign market. That this did not occur under free trade is due to the constraint the foreign firm faces when maximizing profits. The revenues of the firms are given by:
Suppose firms play strategy s 33 = {q h &E, q h &E}, that is, there is a quality reversal. Both firms 16 Notice that low-quality products would be dumped in this equilibrium if r > 0 since p l > (1 − r)p * l = (1 − r) 2 p l . This observation reproduces again the notion of domino dumping: once a country enacts antidumping law, the rival foreign firm that suffers from dumping may give an incentive to its own government to also take an antidumping action.
export to the distant markets. Prices are given by:
and the revenues of the firms are:
Suppose now firms play strategy s 43 = {q h &N E, q &E}. Prices would be given by:
and the revenue expressions by:
Suppose finally that firms play the strategy s 34 = {q h &E, q &N E}. Prices would be given by
and the revenues of the firms by:
Nash equilibria
Having computed the profits of the firms under the different strategy profiles, we are now in a position to analyze the game described in Table 4 . The objective is to search for all Nash equilibria, study the conditions for their existence and explore their trade properties. We note the first main contribution of our paper now: imposing a PU dramatically changes the nature of the game, which gives rise to new and interesting equilibria. In particular, we emphasize that imposing a PU may either lead to a quality reversal, or to the exit of the foreign firm from the home market, or to the exit of the home firm from the foreign market. The second main contribution is to show that when the unique equilibrium that ensues after the domestic government imposes a PU involves a quality reversal, then imposing a PU is indeed consistent with domestic welfare maximization.
Unchanged market structure
Let us start with situations in which the market structure prevailing under free trade is maintained after imposing a PU. To verify whether the pair of strategies s 11 = {q &E, q h &E} continues to be a Nash equilibrium after the policy, it is sufficient to compare R * (s 11 ) with R * (s 12 ) and R(s 11 ) with R(s 21 ) since payoffs from other strategies are strictly dominated. Using (16), (17) and (18), comparisons lead to the following:
When these two conditions are met, an equilibrium where firms play s 11 exists. In order to check whether the domestic country indeed wishes impose a PU, we compute the difference between domestic welfare in this equilibrium, denoted W (s 11 ), and that under free trade, denoted W (F T ).
The comparison gives:
which is clearly negative because the first and third terms are negative and for the second term we can prove that 4(2m
The next proposition formalizes this result and the trade properties of this equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (Unchanged market structure). Suppose the parameters of the model satisfy conditions:
Then if the domestic government were to introduce a PU, the foreign (home) firm would continue to produce high (low) quality and export it to the home (foreign) country. A PU would then result in: (i) an increase in the (hedonic) prices of both variants in the domestic country; (ii) a decrease in (hedonic) prices of both variants in the foreign country; (iii) a decrease in profits of both firms, and (iv) a decrease in domestic consumer surplus. As a result, free trade is an equilibrium of the game and high-quality products continue to be dumped into the domestic economy.
The PU works so as to level off the two markets and as a result domestic prices go up, foreign prices go down, and firms profits decrease. Because of the price increase in the domestic market, domestic consumer surplus decreases. These two facts together (profits and consumer surplus decrease) explain the welfare result.
Notice that µ ≥ 7/4 suffices for (22) to be satisfied. When conditions (21) and (22) hold, the domestic market continues to be attractive for the foreign firm, despite being constrained by the domestic country's policy. The foreign firm continues to export to the domestic country and the equilibrium continues to exhibit intra-industry trade. It turns out that under such circumstances it is in the domestic government interest to permit dumping and not to impose a PU.
Proposition 3 would point to there being a lot of antidumping cases in developing countries against higher-quality products from the rest of the world. This is simply not the case in the data:
though the number of AD initiations is large, imports concerned represent a small fraction of trade of developing countries. Proposition 4 offers an explanation for this outcome: an AD law would simply be welfare reducing, which makes the tolerance of dumping socially desirable. The criterion that the import product must be a "like-product" to the domestic petitioner's product is another very good reason for this. If product quality is different enough, as (22) suggests, it may be hard to make the case of like-products.
Strategic exit of the foreign firm
Suppose that
so that condition (21) fails and the pair of strategies s 11 = {q &E, q h &E} can no longer constitute an equilibrium because if the home firm were to produce the low-quality good and export it abroad, then the foreign firm would prefer to deviate by exiting the home market altogether in order to no longer be subject to the PU. Given this, we next ask whether the pair of strategies s 12 = {q &E, q h &N E} can constitute a Nash equilibrium.
We start by noting that, given that the foreign firm produces high quality and does not export at all, the home firm faces a trade-off. On the one hand, it can choose to produce the low-quality good and export it abroad, thereby obtaining the monopoly profits from the home market plus the duopoly profits from the foreign market. On the other hand, it can choose to produce the high-quality good, which would provide it with the corresponding monopoly profits at home only, irrespective of whether it exports it abroad. The trade-off arises because the monopoly profits from selling high quality in one market only can be higher than the profits obtained from selling low quality in two markets. We note that s 12 is a Nash equilibrium if the latter strategy provides the home firm with a lower profit, that is, when R(s 12 ) > θλmq h /4, which, after rearranging terms gives:
This condition tells us that when the home country has a relatively low income and/or size, profits from the foreign market are sufficiently large and the home firm prefers to produce low quality.
When both conditions (23) and (24) are met, an equilibrium where firms play s 12 after the domestic country imposes a PU exists. As before, in order to check whether imposing a PU is consistent with domestic government incentives, we compute the difference SW (s 12 ) − SW (F T ).
The next proposition gives the trade properties of this equilibrium and the welfare implications.
Proposition 5 (Strategic exit of foreign firm) Suppose the model parameters satisfy the conditions:
Then if the domestic government were to introduce a PU, the foreign firm would continue to produce high quality but stop exporting to the home market, while the domestic firm would produce and export low quality. A PU would then result in: (i) an increase in the (hedonic) price of low quality in the domestic economy (prices in the foreign market remain constant); (ii) a decrease in domestic consumer surplus; (iii) an increase in profits of the home firm, and (iv) a decrease in domestic welfare. As a result, an antidumping policy in the form of a PU can only be rationalized on the basis of lobbying by the domestic firm (i.e., when β 1 = 0, β 2 = 1).
The intuition behind these results is as follows. Since the foreign firm exits the domestic market so as to avoid the PU, prices in the foreign market become equal to the free trade prices. In the domestic market, however, the home firm charges the monopoly price and therefore its profits increase and domestic consumer surplus decreases. As it is usual in situations with market power, the increase in profits does not offset the fall in consumer surplus and social welfare decreases. As a result, a PU that causes the exit of the foreign firm from the domestic market can only be the outcome of successful lobbying by the domestic firm.
To make sure that we remain in a subgame where only the domestic government may contemplate the imposition of a PU, we can impose an additional condition under which the domestic firm does not dump its products when s 12 is played. This condition requires that p (s 12 ) < p * (s 12 ), which gives: 17
We note that the region of parameters for which (25) and (26) jointly hold is non-empty (see section
5.3).
17
This condition excludes what we call domino dumping, that is, dumping by the home firm abroad resulting from the strategic behavior of the foreign firm in response to the initial imposition of AD law. Domino dumping arises because, once the home government enacts AD law, the foreign rival which is accused of dumping, may exit the home market strategically. The latter move by the foreign firm changes the pricing behavior of the home firm in all markets and may lead to dumping by the home firm abroad. This would motivate the foreign government to take an antidumping action as well. Hence, domino dumping is theoretically different from the standard retaliatory motive associated with AD law, though it is difficult to disentangle the two in empirical work unless microdata are used. The above condition is imposed for simplicity, that is, in order to focus on whether the domestic government wishes to enact AD law in a region of parameters where the foreign government does not face dumping in the continuation game.
Strategic exit of the home firm
The home firm may take advantage of the fact that a PU is in place by exiting the foreign market.
By strategically exiting the foreign market, the home firm induces the foreign firm to raise its price in its local market, and, by the PU restriction, in the home market too. This may end up benefiting the home firm. In fact, when (λ + m)(4µ − 1)(4µ − 7) + 9λ < 0 condition (22) fails and the pair of strategies s 11 = {q &E, q h &E} is no longer an equilibrium because, given that the foreign firm produces the high-quality good and exports it abroad, the home firm prefers to deviate by exiting the foreign market altogether.
Given this, we next ask whether the pair of strategies s 21 = {q &N E, q h &E} can constitute a Nash equilibrium. It is obvious that we need condition (22) to fail. A necessary condition for this to happen is µ < 7/4, which suggests that only when the quality gap is sufficiently small the home firm finds it advantageous to exit the foreign market. This is intuitive since when the quality gap is large enough competition between the two products is not so fierce and the gains from weakening competition by exiting are relatively low.
In addition, for the foreign firm not to deviate we require that R * (s 21 ) > θq h /4, which after rearranging gives:
Intuitively this condition requires that the quality gap is not too small for otherwise the foreign firm would again prefer to exit the home market in order to avoid the PU constraint and obtain the monopoly profits from its local market.
When both conditions are met, an equilibrium where firms play s 21 after a PU is imposed by the domestic country exists. As before, in order to check whether imposing a PU is consistent with domestic government incentives, we compute the difference SW (s 21 ) − SW (F T ). Our next result discusses the trade properties of this equilibrium and the welfare implications of a PU for the domestic country.
Proposition 6 (Strategic exit of home firm) Suppose the model parameters satisfy the conditions:
Then if the domestic government were to introduce a PU, the foreign firm would continue to produce and export high quality, while the domestic firm would produce low quality and stop exporting to the foreign market. A PU would then result in: (i) an increase in the (hedonic) prices of low and high quality in the domestic economy; (ii) a decrease in domestic consumer surplus; (iii) an increase in profits of the home firm if
and (iv) a decrease in domestic welfare. As a result, an antidumping policy in the form of a PU can only be rationalized on the basis of lobbying by the domestic firm (i.e., when β 1 = 0, β 2 = 1).
By exiting the foreign market the domestic firm relaxes competition in that market, which tends to raise prices. By the PU restriction prices rise also in the domestic market, which tends to favor the domestic firm. It turns out that profits of the home firm may or may not increase. Since the price it charges domestically increases, profits tend to increase; however, exiting from the foreign market altogether lowers its profits too. Domestic consumer surplus decreases and overall welfare too. As a result, a PU that causes the exit of the home firm from the foreign market can only be explained by successful lobbying by the domestic firm.
Quality reversal and intra-industry trade
Let us now consider the case in which a PU leads to a quality reversal in the marketplace, that is, the shift of quality leadership from the foreign to the domestic firm. For this, we first study the conditions under which the pair of strategies s 33 = {q h &E, q &E} is part of a Nash equilibrium.
As the foreign firm is subject to a PU, for s 33 to be an equilibrium we require that the foreign firm prefers to export its low-quality good to the home country rather than refraining from exporting at all, that is:
Note that this condition is the same as condition (21) . Likewise, given that the foreign firm exports its good to the home country we require that the home firm prefers exporting its high-quality good over not exporting it, that is:
Sufficient conditions for this inequality to hold are (see the Appendix):
Assume that (21) is met along with these two conditions. If the domestic government were to impose a PU, there exists an equilibrium where the foreign firm would stay in the market producing low quality and exporting it to the domestic country. In contrast the home firm would produce and export the high-quality variant. Folding the game backwards, we now ask whether the domestic country wants to deviate from the free trade equilibrium by indeed imposing a PU.
For this, we compute the difference between domestic welfare under s 33 and that under free trade, i.e. SW (s 33 ) − SW (F T ). The following proposition summarizes our findings.
Proposition 7 (Quality reversal and intra-industry trade) Suppose the model parameters satisfy the following three conditions: Condition (21),
Then if the domestic government were to introduce a PU, the home firm would produce high quality and the foreign firm would produce low quality. A PU would then result in: (i) intra-industry trade with no negative effect on world trade; (ii) an increase in the domestic (hedonic) prices of all qualities;(iii) a decrease in domestic consumer surplus;(iv) a substantial increase in profits of the home firm, and (v) an increase in the welfare of the domestic country. As a result, an antidumping policy in the form of a PU can be rationalized on domestic welfare grounds in this case; world welfare decreases though.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The constraint on the foreign firm raises the prices paid for low quality in the domestic and the foreign countries. Prices of high quality follow suit. Domestic consumer surplus under s 33 decreases for two reasons. First, home consumers pay a higher price for all product variants. Second, less consumers demand the low-quality good since hedonic price p /q increases. However, the reversal has a huge impact on domestic firm profits, which more than offsets the negative impact on consumers and ultimately results in an increase in welfare. The figure first shows that for this equilibrium to exist, countries' income differences have to be relatively small; in addition, the figure reveals that the effect of a PU on welfare is very large.
Therefore, under the conditions in Proposition 7 the domestic government has a strong incentive to impose a PU.
We can also verify if the domestic firm does not dump its products into the foreign country. For this we compare p h (s 33 ) and p * h (s 33 ) and obtain p h (s 33 ) − p * h (s 33 ) = −(4µ − 1) < 0, which implies that domino dumping does not arise in this case. 
Quality reversal and exit of the foreign firm
Let us now consider the case where a PU results in the domestic firm gaining quality leadership and to the exit of the foreign firm from the domestic market. For this, we study the conditions under which the pair of strategies s 34 = {q h &E, q &N E} is part of a Nash equilibrium. Under this strategy profile, the home firm produces high quality and exports it to the foreign country; the foreign firm, by contrast, produces low quality to satisfy its local demand only.
Given that the foreign firm is not exporting its low-quality good to the home country, it is obvious that the home firm does not have an incentive to deviate. To ensure that the foreign firm does not deviate either we require that:
Note that this condition is the same as condition (23) and basically says that income differences across countries should be small. Assume that it is met. Then, if the domestic firm were to impose a PU, an equilibrium where the foreign firm chooses to produce low quality and sell it only locally while the domestic firm chooses to produce high quality and export it abroad exists. Computing the difference between domestic welfare under s 34 and that under free trade, i.e. SW (s 34 ) − SW (F T ), we address the issue of whether the domestic country wants to deviate from the free trade equilibrium by enacting AD law if firms are expected to play s 34 thereafter. The following proposition summarizes our findings.
Proposition 8 (Quality reversal and exit of the foreign firm) Suppose that condition (23) holds. Then if the domestic government introduces a PU, there exists an equilibrium where the home firm produces high quality and exports it to the foreign market, while the foreign firm produces low quality and refrains from exporting it to the home market. A PU would then result in: (i) an increase in the domestic (hedonic) price of high quality, while foreign prices remain constant;(ii) a decrease in domestic consumer surplus;(iii) an increase in the profits of the home firm, and (iv) in an increase in social welfare provided that 8(µ − 1) + λm(8µ − 11) > 0. As a result, an antidumping policy in the form of a PU can be rationalized on welfare grounds in this case; world welfare decreases though.
Since the home firm is the only seller in the domestic market, it is clear that the domestic price of high quality is higher than under free trade. At the foreign market, since the foreign firm is not constrained by the PU, prices are exactly the same as under free trade. As a result, it is clear that the domestic firm obtains higher profits but consumers obtain a lower surplus. The welfare effect is however ambiguous. While consumers lose, the home firm revenues increase a lot since after the policy it becomes the high-quality producer.
We can additionally check if the domestic firm does dump its products into the foreign country.
For this we compare p h (s 34 ) = θλq h /2 and p * h (s 34 ) and obtain:
which is negative provided that λ < 4(µ−1 (4µ−1) . Therefore, under this condition, the domestic firm does not dump its products into the foreign country.
Quality reversal and exit of the home firm
Finally, we study the case where a PU results in the domestic firm gaining quality leadership but exiting from the foreign market altogether. For this, we study the conditions under which the pair of strategies s 43 = {q h &N E, q &E} is part of a Nash equilibrium. Under this strategy profile, the home firm produces high quality but does not export it to the foreign country; the foreign firm, by contrast, produces low quality to satisfy its local demand as well as the demand from the domestic country.
We now argue that this cannot be an equilibrium because R(s 43 ) < θµq /4. In fact, we note that
We now observe that the second derivative of (31) with respect to m is equal to
This expression decreases in m and in λ. If we set λ = m = 1 in (32) gives 2µ(37 + 8µ(2µ − 5)) − 8, which is positive for all µ. As a result, (32) is positive, which implies that the derivative of (31) with respect to m increases in m. Let us now set m = 0 in the first derivative of (31) with respect to m. This gives 8λ(µ − 1)(µ(4µ − 3) − 2λ(µ − 1)), which is always positive. From this we conclude that (31) increases in m. We finally set m = 0 in (31) to obtain 16λ 2 (µ − 1) 3 > 0. This concludes the proof that R(s 43 ) < θµq /4. Figure 2 shows the regions of parameters for which the different equilibria discussed above exist.
Overview of equilibria
There are two important points to be emphasized. First, unlike under free trade, for some parameters there is a unique Nash equilibrium. One way to interpret this result is in terms of AD policy operating as an equilibrium selection mechanism. The second important point is that a quality reversal may be the unique outcome following the imposition of a PU, which, as shown in Proposition 7, is consistent with the domestic government incentives.
The size of the different regions depends on the magnitude of the quality gap µ. The left panel of Figure 2 gives the existence regions for µ = 1.5. When λ and m are both relatively small, the foreign firm exits the export market. This is because, given that the home market is not very attractive, the foreign firm finds it profitable to focus its activity on its local market. By doing so, it avoids the PU constraint and this increases the profits it can get from its local consumers.
There are two Nash equilibria in that case, s 12 and s 34 . To select among them, we can again use the Harsany-Selten criterion (cf. Section 4).
be the gains the domestic firm obtains by predicting correctly that the foreign firm will select equilibrium s 12 . Likewise,
h −q 2 ) denotes the gains the domestic firm derives by forecasting correctly that the foreign firm will select equilibrium s 34 . Similarly, for the foreign firm we have
. Equilibrium s 12 is said to risk-dominate equilibrium s 34 whenever G 11 G 21 − G 12 G 22 > 0. Using the expressions above we obtain
This condition does not only depend on cost differences but on cost levels. Given our small investment costs assumption, s 34 risk-dominates equilibrium s 12 .
When λ and m are moderately large, the foreign market is sufficiently profitable to be abandoned by the foreign firm. In such a case we have a unique equilibrium that involves a quality reversal (s 34 or s 33 ). When λ is relatively high and m moderately large, there are two Nash equilibria, namely s 11 and s 33 . Under s 11 the equilibrium is similar to free trade in that the market structure remains unchanged. Under s 33 there is a radical change since the home firm produces the high quality. We can invoke the Harsany-Selten criterion to select among these two equilibria. However, in this case we can only do it numerically. It turns out that s 11 risk-dominates s 33 . Finally, when both λ and m are large, we also have two equilibria (s 21 and s 33 ). The right panel gives the existence regions for µ = 5 instead. The implication of a rise in µ is to reduce the number of possible equilibria with s 34 being the unique equilibrium for relatively low λ and moderate to large m. For these parameters, again, imposing a PU can be rationalized on domestic welfare grounds.
Extensions
In this section we extend the model in two important ways. First, we allow firms to select product quality from a continuum, so quality levels become endogenous. Second, we compare the incidence of a PU with that of an AD duty and derive an equivalence result.
Endogenous quality
In the previous analysis we chose to work with exogenous quality levels in order to illustrate the main insights in the simplest setting. The main purpose of this extension is to demonstrate that our earlier results are not undermined when quality levels are chosen by the firms. Even though it would be possible to replicate the entire analysis with endogenous quality levels, let us focus here on two issues. First we illustrate how the free trade equilibrium is obtained when qualities can be chosen from a continuum. Then, we show that for some parameters the domestic government would find it desirable to impose a PU in order to induce a quality reversal.
In this section, we assume flexible production (Eaton and Schmitt, 1994) , that is, once firms invest in the necessary technology and organize their facilities to develop and produce one basic product, they can produce various downgrades of this basic product at no cost. This idea is modelled via the following specification of R&D costs: domestic firm's costs of producing any two variants q and q * are C(q , q * ) = c max{q , q * } 2 /2; likewise, foreign firm costs of producing variants q h and q * h are given by C * (q h , q * h ) = c * max{q h , q * h } 2 /2, where c and c * are the usual development cost parameters measuring R&D efficiency. This assumption serves to rule out quality strategy profiles where a firm sells different qualities locally and abroad. Because of the presence of (non-trivial) development costs, we shall now use the weighted sum of consumer surplus and firms' profits π as a measure of social welfare in every country: W = β 1 CS + β 2 π, β j ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, 2.
The derivation of the free trade equilibrium follows the steps in section 4, with the additional choice-of-quality stage. The first step is to show that non-exporting strategies are strictly dominated. This implies that in equilibrium there is intra-industry trade. To select among the two possible quality assignments, we use again the Harsany-Selten criterion. The next proposition gives the result (for the proof see our working paper Moraga-González and Viaene, 2007).
Proposition 9 (Endogenous quality gap) With endogenous qualities, the unique (risk-dominant) free trade equilibrium of the export game involves intra-industry trade and is characterized as follows: (i) Goods sell at prices (5) and (6); (ii) Market demands for firms are (7); (iii) the quality gap between the variants µ is the solution to:
(iv) The home firm produces a good of quality
that is sold locally and exported to the foreign country; (v) the foreign firm produces a good of higher quality
for its own market and for exports; (vi) Domestic firm's profits are π = c *h /8, foreign firm's profits π * = 2ch with π * /π = 16c/c * .
Observe that in this free trade equilibrium, variable µ is the unique solution to the third degree polynomial in (33) . It depends on firms' development costs but is independent of λ and m. As prices are similar to those of Proposition 2, Proposition 3 characterizes the conditions for dumping in this context as well.
Let us now show that the strategies s 34 continue to constitute an equilibrium after a PU is imposed; recall that under s 34 , the home firm "leapfrogs" the foreign firm and produces a product of endogenous higher quality; meanwhile the foreign firm finds it profitable to exit the domestic Under the strategies s 34 , the domestic firm picks q h to maximize π = R(s 34 ) − cq 2 h /2, and the foreign firm chooses q to maximize π * = R * (s 34 ) − c * q 2 /2, where R(s 34 ) and R * (s 34 ) are given in (20) . Taking These results clearly show that imposing a PU is incentive compatible provided that the equilibrium that ensues is s 34 . To see whether deviations are profitable, we ask whether any of the firms wishes to pick another quality level and export strategy. Given the strategy of the foreign firm, q &N E, it is readily seen that the home firm does not wish to deviate because by doing so its profits unambiguously fall. To see whether, given the strategy of the home firm, q h &E, the foreign firm wishes to deviate, we first consider the case where it deviates to strategy {q &E}. In this case, it would obtain a deviating payoff equal to π * d = R * (s 33 ) − c * q 2 /2, where the expression for R * (s 33 ) is given in (19) and q h is fixed to 27.87 in the deviation. Maximizing profits with respect to q gives q = 3.96 and a deviating profit equal to π * d = 8.01. As a result, the deviation is not profitable.
Finally, we check whether the foreign firm wants to deviate to {q h &E}, in which case it jumps over the quality of the home firm in the putative equilibrium. In that case, it would obtain a deviating payoff equal to π * d = R * (s 11 ) − c * q 2 h /2, where R * (s 11 ) is given in (19) and q would be fixed to 27.87 in the deviation. Maximizing profits with respect to q h gives q h = 0 and a deviating profit equal to π * d = 0. As a result, the deviation is not profitable.
With these calculations we conclude that for the chosen parameters (which clearly fall in the s 34 -labelled region of Figure 2 ), the equilibrium described by Proposition 8 remains true for the cases when firms are allowed to choose their quality levels.
Equivalence results
The other popular instrument of AD legislation involves the imposition of a duty that equalizes the price that consumers in different countries pay for the same good. Given that the price the foreign firm charges locally is p * h and the export price is p h , an antidumping policy in the form of a duty involves a commitment by the domestic government to levy an ad valorem duty t that equalizes the price that is paid by consumers in different countries:
With an antidumping duty t, demands faced by the foreign and domestic firms are, respectively:
Firms maximize profits given by:
and anticipating the antidumping duty t given by:
Plugging (39) in (37) and taking the FOC dπ * /dp h yields:
The RHS of this FOC is simply the domestic demand for high quality. As long as D h (.) is greater than zero, the profits of the foreign firm are increasing in its export price p h . The optimal pricing behavior of the foreign firm is then to set p h = p * h , which implies that revenues from the duty are zero, as has been shown earlier, for example in Feenstra (2003) . In summary we obtain the following equivalence result.
Proposition 10 An antidumping duty imposed by the domestic government results in an equalization of international prices. Hence, antidumping duties and price undertakings are equivalent in our model.
It is clear from Proposition 10 that, for rational firms, it does not matter whether a PU or an AD duty is levied. What matters is the threat of an AD actoion. An important implication is that antidumping duties could lead to product quality reversals under the same conditions as for price undertakings. Proposition 10 would point out to there being an equal use of AD instruments. This is simply not the case in the data as Table 6 shows. While Argentina has applied a PU in 69.1% of imposed measures, South Africa relies exclusively on antidumping duties (Bown, 2010) . What are the factors that are conducive to this unequal use of AD instruments? For governments, the adoption of one policy instrument hinges on the cost effectiveness of investigations and on the cost of implementing these policies (Nakagawa, 2006) . Very often, a PU is cheaper to adopt and monitor but does not bring revenues when firms deviate from pricing rule (11) . 18 The exchange rate regime should matter as well since the exchange rate pass-through of oligopolistic firms depends on the type of product and on the underlying market structure (Dornbusch, 1987) . With a high exchange rate volatility, the timing of investigations matters and information acquisition becomes costly under a PU. Moreover, the likelihood of deviations from pricing rule (11) is high in which case AD duties would be collected.
Conclusions
We have presented a model of international trade where two firms located in two different countries produce quality-differentiated goods for their local markets and, eventually, for exports. An important feature of our model is the existence of size and income differences across countries, and of asymmetries in firms' R&D costs. We have shown that, under free trade, the unique (riskdominant) Nash equilibrium involves intra-industry trade; in addition, the most efficient firm, the foreign, is the quality leader in the international market. Since consumers in different countries differ in their concern for quality, in equilibrium, unilateral dumping by the foreign firm into the domestic country always takes place. With transport costs, reciprocal dumping may emerge. In the context of dumping of high-quality products, we have studied the incentives of the domestic firm to file a petition for an antidumping action and of the domestic government to honor it.
Our main result is that a PU may lead to a quality reversal in the international market. This results in much greater profits for the home firm than under free trade, which leads to a greater social welfare in spite of the fact that consumers lose. This gives the domestic government incentives to impose a PU. A PU may also lead to the exit of the foreign firm, which favors the domestic one and thereby helps explain why there is so much lobbying by domestic firms for antidumping regulations. When AD duties are considered instead, we have derived an equivalence result between AD duties and a PU.
Though the focus of the paper has been on unilateral dumping cases, we showed situations in which reciprocal dumping would be prevalent under free trade. (ii) Foreign prices. If and only if λ < 1, foreign free trade prices in (6) are higher than the same prices under strategies s 11 in (12) and (13) . Likewise for foreign hedonic prices.
(iii) Firm revenues. To verify whether free trade is preferable to s 11 for the firms, it is sufficient to compare R * (F T ) in (3) with R * (s 11 ), and R(F T ) in (3) with R(s 21 ). The revenue comparison leads to R * (F T ) > R * (s 11 ) and R(F T ) > R(s 11 ) if and only if (1−λ) 2 > 0, which is always satisfied since λ < 1.
(iv) Domestic consumer surplus. Like for free trade, domestic consumer surplus under strategies s 11 is given by
where θ(s 11 ) (taste parameter of the consumer indifferent between buying high or low quality) and θ(s 11 ) (taste parameter of the consumer indifferent between acquiring low quality or nothing at all) are given by
Given this, we obtain the following expression for domestic consumer surplus:
A comparison of CS(s 11 ) with CS(F T ) yields
which is always satisfied under the condition (21) . Intuitively, note that θ(s 11 ) is larger than θ(F T ) and θ(s 11 ) is larger than θ(F T ) if and only if (1 + m)/(m + λ) > 1 which is always satisfied since λ < 1. Hence with all prices being higher, with less consumers being served and less consumers purchasing high quality, we obtain CS(s 11 ) < CS(F T ).
Importantly, result (iii) together with result (iv ) imply a domestic welfare loss following the imposition of a PU by the home government.
Proof of Proposition 5. As explained in the main text, the conditions λ < 1 2+m and λ < 4µ m(4µ−1) 2 follow from the bilateral comparisons between R * (s 11 ) and R * (s 12 ) and between R(s 12 ) and mθλq h /4, respectively. When these two conditions hold, then the pair of strategies s 12 is a Nash equilibrium. (ii) Domestic consumer surplus. The computation of the domestic consumer surplus is simpler than in Proposition 4 since the foreign firm does not export to the home country and hence only low quality is locally available for consumption. Domestic consumer surplus under strategies s 12 is given by:
which is clearly lower than CS(F T ).
(iii) Firm revenues. Since the home firm becomes a monopolist in its own local market, it is obvious that R(s 12 ) > R(F T ). (i) Comparing p (s 21 ) with p (F T ) gives the condition (4µ − 1)(1 − λ) + 3λ > 0, which is always satisfied. For the high-quality good the same condition arises, as well as for hedonic prices.
(ii) Because all prices are higher, it is obvious that domestic consumer surplus decreases. from which we obtain the condition in the Proposition.
(iv) As usual with market power, an increase in prices raises firm profits but decreases consumer surplus; the overall effect is negative.
Proof of Proposition 7. Upon observing this expression, it is readily seen that (29) and (30) The Grubel-Lloyd measure of two-way trade (in value) is:
Like (10) , GL varies between 0 and 100 and is a (more complex) combination of the primitive parameters of the model: m, λ, and µ. Regarding the sum of demands:
which is similar to (7) . Hence, though a quality reversal modifies bilateral trade flows, there is no impact on total trade.
(ii) Home prices. Compare domestic free trade prices in (5) 
We now prove that (41) is positive. First we take the derivative of (41) 
This expression is increasing in λ because its derivative with respect to λ is equal to 2m(1+4µ(4µ− 3)) > 0. Therefore, if (42) = m(1 − λ) 2 (2m − λ) − 4µ 2λ 2 + 2λm 3 + λm(7 − λ(2 − λ)) + m 2 (6 − 4λ(1 − λ)) + 32µ 2 (λ + m) 2 (1 + λm) (44) We now notice that the second derivative of the RHS of (44) with respect to µ is equal to 64(λ + m) 2 (1 + λm) > 0. Therefore the first derivative with respect to µ increases in µ. Setting µ = 1 in the first derivative of the RHS of (44) with respect to µ gives 40m 2 + 4λm [25 + 2m(2 + 7m)] + 8λ 2 (7 + m + 14m 2 ) + 60λ 3 m > 0, from which we conclude that it is positive everywhere. As a result, (44) is increasing in µ. We now set µ = 1 in the RHS of (44) From this we conclude that the RHS of (44) which is clearly negative.
